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FAIR TRADE: THE IDEAL AND REALITY
As a matter of national antitrust policy, a vigorous battle has been
waged against persons who, by their agreements, attempt to restrain
trade and destroy competition. To the general rule prohibiting con-
certed efforts to affect price a narrow exception is made for the sector
of the economy which is involved in the distribution of consumer goods
to their ultimate users. Unsurprisingly, the legislation which accords
favored treatment to this economic enclave has been the subject of
considerable controversy.1
That the controversy is not dead is evidenced by the recent inter-
est shown by courts, state and federal, and the Congress of the United
States. Since 1949 a string of state high court decisions has nibbled
away at the list of forty-six states whose legislatures had adopted fair
trade.2 In 1964 the United States Supreme Court noted probable juris-
diction in a consolidation of two appeals' involving the eligibility of the
Ohio Fair Trade Act4 for antitrust exemption under the McGuire Act.'
A recently proposed federal fair trade statute known as the Quality
Stabilization Act6 has been reported on favorably by the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in 1963.1
This recent concern about fair trade, especially on the part of
Congress, indicates the appropriateness of a re-appraisal of the social
1 Which, as Senator Humphrey accurately quipped in the Report of the Select Com-
mittee on Small Business on a Study of Fair Trade Based on a Survey of Manufacturers
and Retailers, "give[s] off more heat than light." S. Rep. No. 2819, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1956).
2 Only Alaska, Missouri, Texas, Vermont, and the District of Columbia have never
had fair trade. The legislation is now considered unconstitutional in the following states:
Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
In all but Idaho, the unconstitutionality was determined by the highest court of the state.
The non-signer clause of the Hawaii statute has been repealed, Hawaii Sess. Law 1963,
Ch. 88, 51.
3 Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 377 U.S. 386 (1964).
4 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1333.27-.34 (Page 1962).
5 66 Stat. 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(2)-(5) (1964).
6 H.R. 3669, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
7 H.R. Rep. No. 566, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). "Quality Stabilization" is a less
than accurate characterization of the import of the bill if we are to believe the report of
the House Committee which mentioned this purpose neither in the statement of the
purposes nor in the description of the needs giving rise to the proposed legislation.
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and economic ramifications of the permissive legislation.' This com-
ment will discuss these socio-economic ramifications in terms of the
arguments, for and against fair trade, which they underlie.
I. THE NATURE, HISTORY, AND ImPORTANCE OF FAiR TRADE
Fair trade statutes authorize owners of trademarks to enter into
contracts with the distributors of their products wherein the latter
promise to comply with minimum or stipulated prices in reselling the
trademarked products." The immediate effect of the legislation is to
permit a trademark owner to withdraw his product from intrabrand
price competition whenever it is in free and open competition with
other commodities of the same general class.10 A standard feature of
these permissive statutes is a provision for compelling retailers to com-
ply with the price maintenance predilections of the manufacturer 1
whether there has been a contractual agreement to do so or not. Three
statutory techniques have been developed to achieve this end.
The original and still most common means of obtaining retailer
cooperation is the "non-signer" clause. Such a clause, inserted in the
fair trade statute, simply forbids any retailer from knowingly or will-
fully selling or advertising branded commodities below the minimum
prices stipulated in a contract between the manufacturer and any other
retailer. In effect, it extends the obligation of the resale price main-
tenance contract to non-signers thereof.' 2 Any retailer violating the
terms of a contract is guilty of an "unfair trade practice" for which a
remedy at law or equity is provided to persons injured by the violation.
A recently developed technique for universalizing the effectiveness
of the fixed minimum prices is to imply a price maintenance contract
between the manufacturer and the retailer by legislative fiat. The "im-
plied contract" statutes 3 provide that an acceptance of goods for resale
8 Theoretically the doctrine of judicial self-restraint and the corollary liberal
standard of substantive due process in economic matters foreclose judicial inquiry into
the "wisdom" of legislative acts.
9 In doing so the acts amount to a legislative abrogation of the ancient common
law prohibition of restraints on the alienation of personalty. See Coke on Littleton
§ 233(a).
10 This interbrand competition prerequisite (sometimes described as "fair and open
competition") is virtually the only limitation on the use of the statutes.
11 Although wholesalers, importers, for instance, may be and often are trademark
proprietors, for convenience the word "manufacturer" will be used to designate anyone
with whom branded merchandise originates.
12 Examples of non-signer clauses are: Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16904; Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 121 Y2, § 189 (Smith-Hurd 1960); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1333.07 (Page 1962).
13 Which have so far been adopted in only two states: Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 1333.28(I); Va. Code Ann. § 59.8.2(10) (Supp. 1964).
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with notice of an established minimum resale price constitutes accep-
tance of the price. By merely notifying retailers of his intentions, a
manufacturer becomes eligible for damages or injunctive relief against
any retailer who frustrates his price maintenance objectives.
The most radical device for accomplishing manufacturer control
over retail price is a legislative declaration that the trademark owner re-
tains an untransferable interest in his products so long as they bear his
mark. Such a statute would permit the manufacturer to establish retail
price minimums and enforce them as a matter of property right. Thus
far, only the Ohio legislature has invested trademark owners with con-
tinuing and inalienable interests in their products.14 Even the Ohio
provision is probably inadequate to reserve to the manufacturer con-
tinuing rights in the transferred commodity such as would allow en-
forcement of the broad price maintenance goals intended by fair
trade.15 The proposed federal fair trade law contains a similar provi-
sion. It too is probably too narrow to reproduce the legal effects of
other fair trade statutes.16 There is no reason, however, why such pro-
visions could not be drafted more broadly to make them satisfactory
substitutes for or supplements to other statutory varieties of fair trade.
Although the first legislative sanction17 of contracts to maintain
retail price was an early depression California statute,18 efforts at ob-
taining producer control of retail prices had begun long before. 9 In
1911, the Supreme Court decided Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co.,20 in which it was held that a series of vertical 21 price
14 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1333.31 (Page 1962).
15 Arguably, it does nothing more than supply an additional theory for recovery for
trademark violations: by characterizing them as violations of his continuing "proprie-
tary interest" in the commodity, recovery can be predicated on this property right.
16 H.R. 3669, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1963) (as amended by committee). The
proposed federal statute in its entirety goes much farther than does existing state fair
trade legislation.
37 Attempts at wholesale price maintenance date back to 1876 when the predecessor
of the National Wholesale Druggist's Association was formed to curb excessive competi-
tion. Bowman, "The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance," 22 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 825, 826 (1955).
18 Cal. Stat. 1931, ch. 278, §§ 1-5.
19 A 1913 New Jersey statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56.4-1, -2 (1964), forbids retailers
from discriminating against or appropriating brand names by depreciating the value of
the goods in the public mind, from using price inducements and making misrepresentations
as to value or quality, and from engaging in unfair discrimination against buyers where
notice prohibiting these practices appears on the goods. The remedies of injunction and
damages were provided the injured trademark owner.
20 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
21 A vertical price fixing agreement is one between parties standing at different
levels of production or distribution, e.g., between a wholesaler and a retailer. These are
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agreements between a manufacturer and his several retail distributors
tended to stifle competition among retailers and therefore was no more
permissible under the Sherman Act22 than the similar horizontal price-
fixing agreements. Following this decision, a number of manufacturers
of national brands combined to form the American Fair Trade League.
The purpose of this organization was to secure protection for the good-
will of its members from the "disparaging" effects of loss-leader selling,
a device sometimes used by retailers to stimulate business. The manu-
facturers felt that they possessed a legitimate property interest in the
brand names and product images which they had tediously built up
with expensive national advertising and intensive merchandising. This
interest, they argued, deserved protection from those retailers who
would attempt to build their own reputations by selling trademarked
items at cut-rate prices, lending an aura of cheapness to the "bait"
product in the process. The League was to accomplish its aim of trade-
mark protection by promoting fair trade laws which would legalize
vertical minimum price agreements and permit their use in fighting the
evils of loss-leader merchandizing.23
In the early thirties, retailers displaced manufacturers as the chief
proponents of fair trade after two decades of efforts on the part of the
latter group had virtually failed to produce any legislation. The re-
tailers' interest sprang, no doubt, from the increasingly adverse cir-
cumstances in which they found themselves. The general decline in
economic activity which characterized that period combined with the
wider use of new and more efficient distribution methods to put serious
pressures on persons engaged in traditional "small-time" retailing.
While no one could do anything about the depression, the small retailer
saw the emerging chain stores with their discount prices as an ill with
an easy cure. The challenge of the more efficient chain store and its
unbeatably low prices was met with restrictive legislation. Fair trade
was but one of several legislative remedies pushed through by retail
merchants.24 The attack was first focused at the state level and in 1931,
to be distinguished from horizontal agreements, the parties to which are on the same
level and therefore are competitors.
22 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
23 Fair trade is not the only way of achieving resale price maintenance. Vertical
integration with retailer outlets, consignment selling, franchised selling, selective refusals
to deal with price cutters, and direct selling by the manufacturer to consumers other than
in retail outlets are all devices which might be used to place control of retail prices on
the manufacturer.
24 Tax legislation which discriminated against high volume retailers (so-called
"(anti-chain store acts") were enacted. See, e.g., Cal. Stat. 1935, ch. 849; NX. Laws
Spec. Sess. 1934, ch. 33. Such acts have been held unconstitutional as violations of
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California became the first state to authorize, 5 at least for intrastate
transactions, the sort of resale price maintenance contract which was
declared invalid by Dr. Miles.28 It was soon realized that the statute,
as enacted, was almost as ineffective to maintain price as none at all,
for it bound no one who was unwilling to consent to the stipulated
price minimum anyway. In 1933, the crucial non-signer clause was
added permitting parties to fair trade contracts to bind persons who
had not consented. Vigorous efforts to induce passage of fair trade
statutes in other states followed the success in California. The National
Association of Retail Druggists emerged to assume a position of partic-
ular prominence in the leadership of the campaign. Apparently appre-
hensive that theirs was a cause unlikely to draw support from those
aware of its anticompetitive aims, the Association spared no effort in
hiding the bill's true effects from the legislators who were to approve
them .2 Legislative consideration of the Association's proposed bill was
so superficial that a gross stenographic error slipped through eleven
state legislatures, and another lesser one was neglected by seventeen. 9
At the same time, retail druggists were literally regimented under
neighborhood "captains" into a militant lobbying force."
Despite the pressures brought on state legislatures to enact fair
trade laws, the actual results were spotty. With the ghost of Dr. Miles
lurking in the background, the states probably quite rightly feared that
most contracts entered pursuant to a fair trade statute would be viola-
tive of the Sherman Act; thus it would be pointless to enact legislation
purporting to authorize them. These doubts were dispelled by Congress
in its approval of a rider to a District of Columbia revenue and appro-
equal protection guarantees. See, e.g., Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550
(1935). Also enacted were "Unfair Sales Acts" or "Unfair Trade Practices Act," for-
bidding sales at less than cost to divert trade from or injure competitors. See, e.g., Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 325.04 (Supp. 1964); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 69-301, -306 (1955); Va. Code
Ann. §§ 59-9 to -19.1 (Supp. 1964). The manifest purpose of both types of legislation was
to provide the small retailer legal shelter against powerful competitors.
25 Cal. Stat. 1931, ch. 278, §§ 1-5.
26 Supra note 20.
27 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16904.
28 A more detailed account of the efforts to conceal the nature of fair trade appears
in Edwards, Memorandum for the Assistant Attorney General, Re Grounds for the
Repeal of Miller-Tydings Which Authorizes Resale Contracts (1941), reprinted in Hear-
ings on H.R. 4365 Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 436 (1952).
29 Ibid. Edwards reported that the absence of an active opposition to the bills was
due in part to threats of economic reprisals. Ibid.
30 Ibid.
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priations bill.31 Known as the Miller-Tydings Act, the rider withdrew
the prohibitions of the Sherman Act from fair trade contracts entered
in accordance with local law.2 Federal control was thus abdicated to
what proponents of the Act styled as the sovereign will of the states.33
The Supreme Court had, in the meantime, sustained the constitu-
tionality of the non-signer clauses in Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Sea-
gram-Distillers Corp.34 There, the non-signer clause of the Illinois Fair
Trade Act35 was held to be a valid exercise of the police power free
from due process and equal protection objection, in that it protected
the goodwill of a manufacturer as symbolized by his trademark. With
both constitutional and Sherman Act objections to fair trade thus
eliminated, state legislatures apparently felt free to adopt it; within
a year, twenty-eight states became fair trade jurisdictions.3 6
Thus fair trade entered its greatest period of popularity and
acceptability. Soon the legislatures of forty-six jurisdictions had
adopted it.
Then, in 1951, the Supreme Court perpetrated a brief crisis by
limiting the applicability of the Miller-Tydings amendment to "con-
sentual contracts and agreements," leaving the coercive non-signer
clauses invalid as violative of the Sherman Act.37 Fair trade laws were
reduced to impotency. Lacking the means to force compliance on the
part of unwilling retailers, a program of resale price maintenance would
be almost impossible. Response to this decision was immediate. The
next year Congress passed the McGuire Act3" which exempted non-
signer clauses from Sherman Act coverage. 9 Quick judicial approval of
McGuire Act provisions came in 1953 when it was upheld by the Fifth
Circuit.40 The recent Supreme Court decision in Hudson Distribs., Inc.
31 50 Stat. 673, 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), (Title VIII-Amendment to the
Antitrust Laws).
32 Ibid.
-3 See the testimony of Edward S. Rogers for the National Association of Retail
Druggists in Hearings on S. 3822 Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1936).
34 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
35 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 121 '/, § 189 (Smith-Hurd 1960).
30 In addition to the thirteen already having it on the books.
37 Schwegman Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
38 66 Stat. 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(2)-(5) (1964).
39 The McGuire Act also cleared up several problems arising under Miller-Tydings
such as whether stipulated, as opposed to minimum, price agreements were permissible,
and whether fair trade agreements could be construed as an unreasonable burden on
commerce.
40 Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205 F.2d 788 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856 (1953).
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v. Eli Lilly & Co.41 provides reassurance that, absent congressional
action, the competition-fostering Sherman Act will not return to haunt
future fair trade agreements.
Fair trade has done less well in avoiding conflict with the various
provisions of state constitutions. The recent trend has been to find non-
signer clauses invalid" either as unlawful delegations of legislative
power to private interests43 or as unnecessary to the public welfare and
therefore beyond the scope of the police power.44 Laws permitting fair
trade agreements are still operative in at least twenty-one jurisdictions,
however."
Despite the much touted potential benefit which fair trade pro-
vides them, manufacturer interests have taken little advantage of the
legislation. It was estimated in 1959 that fewer than one percent of all
manufacturers engage in the resale price maintenance programs which
affect between four and ten percent of all retail sales.46 For more than
seventy percent of retailers selling fair traded items, such sales
amounted to less than ten percent of their total.47 Often, even when a
manufacturer does pursue an official policy of fair trading his products,
41 377 U.S. 386 (1964).
42 For a complete list of states wherein fair trade has been found violative of
local constitutional guarantees, see note 2 supra.
43 E.g., Florida: Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d
371 (Fla. 1949); Louisiana: Dr. G.H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros.
Giant Super Markets, 231 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343 (1956); Minnesota: Remington Arms
Co. v. G.E.M. of St. Louis, Inc., 257 Minn. 562, 102 N.W.2d 528 (1960) ; Pennsylvania:
Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. White Cross Stores, Inc., No. 6, 414 Pa. 95, 199 A.2d
266 (1964). The argument has also been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Illinois: Joseph Triner
Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill. 559, 2 N.E.2d 929 (1936), aff'd, 299 U.S. 183 (1936); Maryland:
Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A.2d 176 (1939).
44 See, e.g., Arkansas: Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., v. White River Distribs.,
Inc., 224 Ark. 558, 275 S.W.2d 455 (1955); Michigan: Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool
Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952). The argument has also
been unsuccessful. See, e.g., California: Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. 2d 446,
55 P.2d 177 (1936); and Illinois: Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, supra note 43. The
contention that fair trade violates state equal protection provisions was accepted by a
majority of the Florida Supreme Court in Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling
Corp., supra note 43, at 385 (concurring opinion). That it violates state constitutional
anti-monopoly provisions was accepted by other supreme courts. See, e.g., Montana:
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Skaggs Drug Center, Inc., 139 Mont. 15, 359 P.2d
644 (1961); Utah: General Elec. Co. v. Thrifty Sales, Inc., 5 Utah 2d 326, 301 P.2d 741
(1956). These contentions have not been relied on elsewhere in invalidating fair trade.
45 An ambiguous situation exists in Idaho where an appellate court has ruled fair
trade unconstitutional but no case has yet reached the supreme court.
46 Herman, "A Statistical Note on Fair Trade," 4 Antitrust Bull. 583, 584, 586
(1959). (1954-56 estimate 6.9%, 1959 "substantially less.")
47 S. Rep. No. 2819, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1956).
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lax enforcement results in a return to the intrabrand competitive situa-
tion. A mere one-third of the manufacturers engaged in fair trade were
able to report in a congressional survey that they had not encountered
major enforcement difficulties. 8 Cost of enforcement seems to be the
greatest problem; however, adversity on the part of the courts, dis-
count houses, and retailers desiring nationally advertised loss-leaders
have also been cited as posing substantial difficulties.49
Despite the common argument that fair trade legislation is in-
tended to protect the small manufacturer, large manufacturers are very
much involved in fair trade. In 1954 approximately twenty percent of
fair trading manufacturers accounted for about eighty-two percent of
all sales of fair traded merchandise." Significantly, the resources
needed to carry on a costly program of resale price maintenance suc-
cessfully would most likely be at the disposal of larger concerns."'
Fair trade legislation is actively utilized in only a rather small
group of industries. There seems to be a disproportionate interest
among manufacturers of articles which are distributed principally
through retail drug outlets. In 1954 this group comprised nearly forty-
six percent of all manufacturers using fair trade and accounted for
forty-two percent of all sales of fair-trade merchandise.52
II. THE Socio-EcoNomIc RATIONALE
This being the approximate status of fair trade, what has moti-
vated its proponents to support its development this far, and what rea-
sons exist supporting a policy of encouraging or discouraging future
development? Fair trade results inevitably in a drain on the resources
of the economy. Like any social program it has its social costs. Some
argue that this cost is in the form of increased prices which the con-
48 S. Rep. No. 2819, supra note 47, at 7.
49 S. Rep. No. 2819, supra note 47, at 8. In spite of this relative unimportance on
the marketplace, many retailers see repeal as having disastrous results. It has been
suggested that fair trade acts be strengthened by making incorrigible competitors guilty
of a crime and subject to fines or imprisonment. S. Rep. No. 2819, supra note 47, at 21-22.
50 Herman, supra note 46, at 588.
51 Resale price maintenance does not come cheaply; expenditures up to $900,000
have been reported. S. Rep. No. 2819, supra note 47, at 7. While the Senate Report did
not specify that this was an annual, rather than the aggregate, expenditure, the form of
the question posed to manufacturers implies that the figures given are annual ones.
S. Rep. No. 2819, supra note 46, at 23. Besides, annual figures would be the only meaning-
ful ones in this regard, adding justification to the assumption.
52 Herman, supra note 46, at 585. In addition, smoking articles and photographic
supplies accounted for 6.6% and 4.8% of sales, respectively. Other major classifications are
electrical appliances (13.6%) and alcoholic beverages (9.5%). Ibid.
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sumer must pay for the objects of his consumption.5" It may also take
the form of decreased profits to the proprietors of manufacturing con-
cerns which must draw substantially on the resources of their sales and
legal departments in enforcing fair trade.54 The firm which was named
in a survey of retailers as being the most successful in eliminating cut-
rate sales of its products reported spending about 750,000 dollars an-
nually in the enforcement of its more than 250,000 fair trade contracts
with retailers and wholesalers.55 Whether he be stockholder or con-
sumer, someone must bear this cost; is this burden justifiable?
A. Advantages Provided the Manufacturer
At first glance it seems odd that a manufacturer would want fair
trade at all. His best interest would normally be expected to be served
by a competitive distribution of his product at the least mark-up over
his factory price, since this maximizes his sales.56 Before a manufac-
turer can engage in fair trade, as a matter of economic practicality, he
must have some degree of monopoly power. With it, he may share with
the market control over the prices of his products.57
The original impetus for resale price maintenance contracts* was
to provide the trademark owner with a defense against assaults on his
goodwill effected by discount selling. Though the term "goodwill" is
ambiguous, it clearly does not here refer to the favorable customer
relations produced by supplying the greatest quantities at the least
cost. By engaging in resale price maintenance, the trademark owner
53 The Federal Trade Commission, reporting on its extensive empirical study of
resale price maintenance, concluded that the administrative costs of fair trade (includ-
ing the extra burden placed on crowded dockets) resulted in "the enhancement and
maintenance of high living costs." FTC, Report on Resale Price Maintenance, Summary
and Conclusions LXI (1945).
54 S. Rep. No. 2819, supra note 47, at S. Some firms have even set up special de-
partments devoted to handling their fair trade programs.
55 S. Rep. No. 2819, supra note 47, at 18. That this is an annual, not the aggregate,
amount is to be inferred from the form of the question asked manufacturers. See supra
note 51.
56 See generally Telser, "WVhy Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade," 3 J.L. &
Econ. 86 (1960).
57 Id. at 87-88. Monopoly power sufficient for this purpose may be had by virtue of
a trademark or other means of product differentiation. The economic necessity of some
monopoly power to control price seems at odds with the legal requirement that the
commodity be in "free and open competition with other commodities of the same
general class." See text accompanying supra note 9. The legal prerequisite of competition
has been a weak limitation on the use of fair trade where the court has considered
it at all. Apparently no amount of market control short of absolute monopoly will dis-
qualify a manufacturer from engaging in fair trade. See text accompanying notes 67 &
68 infra.
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may hope to (1) protect that demand for his product which is attribut-
able to consumer preference for higher priced lines, or (2) create good-
will among the retailers on whom he must rely to help conduct his non-
price competitive campaign against other producers. The two will be
considered individually.
1. Consumer Goodwill
Producers who find that their selling volume actually increases
with increased price are prime candidates for fair trade. That the public
should respond to a higher price by greater consumption is, of course,
the uncommon situation; such products are said to be negatively price
elastic. Negative price elasticity exists where a higher price, usually
tending to deter purchase, acts as a positive inducement to the purchase
of the goods in question. That is, the desirability of the goods, and hence
the amount which will be paid for them, is actually enhanced in the eye
of the consumer by virtue of their higher price. This enhanced subjec-
tive value is more than enough to overcome any decrease in relative
desirability 3 incident to higher price. Typical of goods which are af-
fected in this manner are many luxury items and status symbols. Much
of the satisfaction derived from such goods is the ego-nurturement pro-
vided by the atmosphere of exclusiveness which surrounds their con-
sumption. This feeling that one is part of an exclusive group is a
pleasurable one that people will pay for. The idea that consumption of
particular goods evidences a cultivated taste or elevated status may
have been inculcated by advertising or simply by exposure to the gen-
eral reputation of the product. However, the effectiveness of many
products' snob-appeal depends on their being available only at an
exclusive price. A price-cutting retailer can ruin the image.
The reputation of exclusive products will generally lead to con-
siderable interest among members of the "excluded" consumer class
when the price is brought nearer that of less expensive substitutes. The
prospect of this interest tempts retailers to sell the product at a loss
in order to lure customers into the store hoping to make up the loss
with profits on other sales. When products are sold at such abnormally
low prices, their exclusiveness vanishes. Their manufacturer may find
that after a temporary burst of activity, his long run sales volume will
decrease. With vanishing exclusiveness goes all value as a loss-leader.
Also gone may be former customers who have abandoned the product
58 In this situation, "desirability" refers both to the extent to which the good
is wanted as well as whether its acquisition is economically feasible. That is, for these
purposes, even a commodity which is wanted or needed very much would be considered
"undesired" if the wherewithal to purchase it is lacking.
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to the masses. The manufacturer is left with two choices: rebuild the
reputation of his product by another costly advertising campaign (only
to risk another round of disparagement), or lower his wholesale price to
permit retailers to appeal to a wider market. The latter choice would
probably net him less profit than did his former policy of snob-appeal.
Otherwise, he would not have been pursuing the former policy in the
first place. In fair trade, such manufacturers have a potent weapon
against the demeaning trait of mass consumption.
Negative price elasticity may also result where the consumer
takes price as an indicium of quality. Since most consumers are inexpert
about much of what they buy, they must rely rather heavily on such
factors as price in determining which of several competing items is
best in materials, construction, engineering, etc.59 Manufacturers nat-
urally want to foster confidence in their products and are therefore
perturbed by retailers who advance their own causes by selling prod-
ucts at unnaturally low, loss-leader prices.
The consumer who might at first find it advantageous to purchase
well known products at the economical loss-leader prices would, it is
argued, also come out the loser in the long run. As the "orderly market-
ing" of merchandise broke down, price would come to reflect not
quality but simply the whim of the retailer. With nothing to guide their
choice, many consumers would find themselves purchasing shoddy
merchandise. Since consumers could not respond to a superior product
by buying it (because there is no way to recognize its superiority) the
impetus to produce better merchandise would die.
Precisely how far this hypothetical diseased condition would go
if unchecked (e.g., by fair trade) is impossible to predict, but it may
be helpful to recall that- the markets in which our modern industrial
economy was built were subject to the undiluted brunt of such objec-
tionable merchandising techniques. Fair trade also postdated the period
when some of the most famous brand names were popularized. Quality
is a stable attribute of a product. Eventually the better reputation of
those products which perform better ought to lead to more sales. Even
if price were to become an entirely unreliable indicator of quality, per-
formance would soon replace it as the criterion. But, in sum, though
quality is not as fleeting a trait as snob-appeal, a manufacturer can find
fair trade useful in protecting his products from the clouds on their
reputation which loss-leader selling may precipitate.
It is not difficult to agree that where higher price does affect favor-
59 Tausig, in 1916, was perhaps the first to note this "irrational" association of price
and quality by consumers, Tausig, "Price Maintenance," 4 Am. Econ. Rev. 170-84
(Supp. 1916).
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ably the quantity of a product which is demanded, and therefore is a
positive attribute of the manufacturer's product just as are usefulness
and aesthetic value, it is a proper legislative function to afford protec-
tion to that higher price just as it would be given to other valuable
traits. Fair trade seems to serve this valid and commendable purpose.6"
On the other hand, however desirable may be the protection of the
property right of trademark owners, fair trade might be an inappro-
priate way of going about it.6 To remedy the evils of loss-leader mer-
chandising by investing private persons with broad discretion to set the
prices at which others must sell is not necessarily warranted by the
exigencies of the situation. Resale price maintenance can throttle not
only loss-leader selling but the benefits of competitive marketing as
well. 2 Enactment of statutes aimed at loss-leaders or bait-merchandis-
ing specifically6 3 perhaps represent a more sophisticated attack on the
problem in that they lack the undesirable side effect of destroying price
competition.
2. Retailer Goodwill
It is the goodwill of retailers that fair trading manufacturers are
probably most interested in preserving.64 While prices are important in
determining how much of his product a manufacturer will be able to
sell, other considerations often play heavily upon and indeed may
dominate the consumer's final choice. The services which the retailer
offers in conjunction with an item can cause the purchaser to choose
it over competing lines irrespective of price. These services, such as
special repairs, may be beneficial to the consumer, but more generally
they take the form of efforts by the retailer to "push" one manufac-
turer's line over that of another. Recommending the favored line and
placifig it where it is more likely to catch the eye of the prospective
purchaser are among methods which are useful in inducing a greater
sales volume of a particular brand.65
60 It is by no means certain that fair trade is worth the expense to the manufacturer,
though. If it really worked, one would expect that after three decades more manufacturers
would be taking advantage of it.
61 Accord, Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 149, 153-55 (1955) which,
though recognizing that fair trade was calculated to serve certain valid commercial
purposes, declared its operation too broad. The majority recommended outright repeal
of federal permissive legislation. A minority thought that repeal should be accompanied
by an anti-loss leader provision. A few favored maintenance of the status quo.
62 Id. at 153-54.
63 E.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17044; Idaho Code Ann. § 48-404 (1948); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 19.90.040 (1961).
14 Cf. Telser, supra note 56, at 89-96.
65 The services referred to in this connection must be carefully distinguished from
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Manufacturers are naturally interested in obtaining these special
services for their products, and by using fair trade to guarantee re-
tailers a higher mark-up on their products, they hope to receive such
services. The actual effectiveness of resale price maintenance in pro-
curing the desired treatment is, of course, not accurately measurable.
However, in a survey of retailers, fifty-six percent admitted to "push-
ing" fair traded lines. 6 The extent to which other merchants may tend
unconsciously to emphasize more profitable items would not be reflected
in the survey. The same survey also revealed that over one-half of the
retailers who quit stocking fair traded items did so because of poor
enforcement. This certainly suggests the value of a well-policed price
maintenance program in creating interest in one's product at the retail
level. 7 Moreover, absent fair trade, the incentive to offer these special
services would be diminished because many consumers, after being
sold by one retailer, would make their actual purchase from another
who offers the lowest price. Thus, a manufacturer cannot really succeed
in obtaining the special services by merely granting wholesale price
advantages to retailers who render them.
Of course there is some question as to whether the special services
of the retailer will be sufficiently influential to overcome the downward
pressure on volume attending the higher price. This is especially sig-
nificant where a substantial portion of a manufacturer's output is sold
through stores not rendering services, and therefore in interbrand com-
petition where price reigns supreme. On the other hand, product differ-
entiation and the public's acceptance of price as at least a partial index
to quality give the manufacturer some monopoly control over price.
Where demand for his product is relatively inelastic, the manufacturer
enjoys considerable freedom in setting price without serious conse-
quences for his sales volume. Also, while the extent of the retailer's con-
trol over the customer's choice among competing brands is conjectural,
it would be unrealistic to assume that his influence, wielded at the time
of purchase, is not considerable."
general services (such as air-conditioning the premises, a storewide policy of backing
what is sold, or smiling clerks) which affect all brands in the same way. Retail prices
will tend to vary from store to store in accordance with the general services offered.
General services would be expected to be of visible benefit to the consumer since they
are weapons which the retailer uses in his competition with other retailers. The services
sought by manufacturers relate specifically to the favored product, tending to single it
out for intensified consumer interest.
66 S. Rep. No. 2819, supra note 47, at 19-20.
67 S. Rep. No. 2819, supra note 47, at 14.
68 A result of these promotional tactics is that the consumer probably pays more
for a product than he would if it were distributed in a competitive retail market. The
extra charge is exacted to compensate the retailer for services rendered the manufacturer,
which services may be useless to or may tend to mislead the consumer.
[Vol. 27
COMMENT
The use of fair trade to obtain special services from retailers is a
substitute for advertising. Each dealer becomes, in effect, a small
advertising agent for the trademark owner, remuneration taking the
form of higher profits on his sales. Small manufacturers who cannot
afford expensive advertising outlays may especially benefit from the
existence of this type of promotion device. What may make fair trade
more objectionable in this role than is advertising (apart from the fact
that it offers none of the indirect benefits that advertising provides in
the form of television entertainment and magazines, for instance), is
that its nonpublic nature impedes control. In a situation where the
temptation to mislead the consumer is very great, machinery for con-
trol is almost nonexistent. The public nature of advertising at least
makes it more amenable to the surveillance of such policing agencies
as the Federal Trade Commission. The trust, which is commonly
placed in, for example, the retail druggist, attenuates the need for con-
trol and certainly militates against creating a situation where persons
may profit by inducing its abuse.
3. Other Motivations
Another motive manufacturers have offered in support of fair trade
is that it is necessary to preserve the small retailer on whom they de-
pend to provide the desired wide distribution of their products. It is
apparently feared by some that unless small retailers are guaranteed
a fair profit on the sale of a manufacturer's products, they will lose
interest in handling the line or, even worse, will be forced to close.
Both results will tend to restrict distribution."9 Arguably distribution
would be just as wide, if less diffuse, in a somewhat more concentrated
retail market; but whatever the validity of the notion that more outlets
produce greater sales volume, the fairness of burdening the consumer
with the extra cost is questionable. If the demise of the small business-
man is the result of the deceptive loss-leader tactics of an unscrupulous
few, then it is in the public interest to stop it. If, however, manufactur-
ing interests prefer a style of retailing that the public has opted to re-
ject, it hardly seems equitable to charge the many with support of the
self-interested predilections of the few. If a manufacturer wants the
economic extravagance of a store on every corner carrying his product,
he should be willing to pay the price rather than shifting to the con-
sumer the burden of subsidizing otherwise unprofitable operations.
Of minor importance is the use that cartel participants can make
of fair trade to police the market division and prices, which have been
calculated to maximize cartel profits.70 Using resale price maintenance,
69 S. Rep. No. 2819, supra note 47, at 11-14.
70 Telser, supra note 56, at 96.
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an individual manufacturer can be prevented from spoiling the market
for the whole group by attempting to increase his share through price
competition. The enthusiasm with which marketing conspiracies are
pursued under modern antitrust laws makes apprehensions of this sort
of abuse a bit unrealistic; however, in view of the ease with which
"conscious parallelism" deteriorates into tacit conspiracy71 we should
beware of legalizing any scheme which may tend to facilitate horizontal
price fixing at any level.72
B. Protection Provided tke Retailer
The interest of retailer trade associations in the promotion of fair
trade can hardly be explained in terms of the traditionally announced
goals of protecting the goodwill of trademark owners.73 Yet, retailer
organizations have taken a great interest in the vitality of fair trade,
and they probably are now behind nearly all promotional activities in
its behalf.74 Their concern is the threat to the present structure of re-
tail marketing posed by the giant discounters who are taking smaller
markups on products which are sold in competition with small business.
The resulting lower prices are a considerable attraction to shoppers
who patronize the discounters in ever greater numbers. This trend puts
a pinch on retailers whose small scale of operations often makes it im-
possible to meet the challenge of price competition. Fair trade shelters
these smaller retailers from competitive pressures and it may possibly
mean the difference between survival or failure for marginal establish-
71 Department of justice, Report to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate
Select Committee on Small Business, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., on a Study of the Development
of the Antitrust Laws and Current Problems of Antitrust Enforcement 21 (Subcomm.
Print No. 3, 1952).
72 For a rather thorough discussion of the usefulness of fair trade in policing
illegal price-fixing agreements among competitors, see FTC, Resale Price Maintenance
522-37 (1945). It is also noted that the initiative for fixing prices tends to shift from
manufacturers to powerful retailer associations, hence the effectiveness of retail price
maintenance programs where strong trade associations adopt the guild spirit. Id. at
547.
73 Equally inexplicable in traditional terms is the interest of wholesalers who have
no trademark rights of their own. The fair trade legislation of a number of jurisdictions
is designed to allow wholesalers to enter resale price maintenance contracts with their
retailer customers even where they have no brand-associated goodwill to protect. Indeed,
the right of the trademark owner to exclusive control of the use of his mark may be
impaired by officious wholesalers who may place price conditions on its use.
74 E.g., such groups as the Ohio Hardware Association, Ohio Retail Food Dealers,
Ohio Association of Tobacco Distributors, Ohio Retail jewelers Association, and the
Ohio State Pharmaceutical Association joined with others in arguing as amici curiae
before the Supreme Court in Hudson Distribs., Inc., v. Eli Lilly & Co., 377 U.S.
386 (1964). See Fulda, "Resale Price Maintenance," 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 175, 180-84 (1954).
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ments. The new giants are, of course, in business to succeed and in pur-
suit of that end they must attempt to draw customers away from long
established trading relationships. Lower prices made possible in various
ways, some related to size, are their chief weapon in this struggle.
Many feel that fair trade is necessary to protect small retailers from
destruction by falling prey to the competitive advantages accruing to
mere largeness. 7r
That the survival of small business is important to the small busi-
nessman goes without saying. A number of reasons why the survival of
small retailing is important to the public welfare, and therefore a proper
subject of legislative action, have been advanced as well. Of course,
small scale retailing provides countless persons with a means of earn-
ing a respectable livelihood. Moreover, small businessmen, striking out
on their own, represent and help preserve the healthy spirit of inde-
pendence that many feel is disappearing in this age of anonymity. It
has less sentimentally been suggested that the small businessman is "a
very vital element of American democracy" who is a "principal source
of leadership and support" of community undertakings." Thus, there
may be valid social reasons for arresting a trend which is destroying
valuable social assets and at the same time working the serious eco-
nomic hardship of unemployment upon many. Even though it may
mean a higher price on consumer goods, perhaps the added cost is
justified by noneconomic, social benefits which result. On the other
hand, this could be characterized as the unnatural preservation of in-
stitutions which have outlived their economic usefulness by eliminating
the competition whose function it is to weed out the inefficient. In this
connection it should be emphasized that destroying small business does
not mean destruction of the small businessman; the impact of competi-
tive forces is merely to divert his labors to more useful enterprise.
1. Preservation of Competition
Despite its rather clear anticompetitive effects, fair trade has been
seriously argued to be a necessary measure to preserve competitive re-
tailing and to ward off the retailing monopolies which would grow in its
absence. To evaluate this contention, a brief analysis of retail competi-
tion will be undertaken with attention to the effects on its operation of
artificial price rigidities such as result under fair trade. Secondly, the
utility and value of fair trade in averting loss-leader induced monop-
oly will be discussed. Finally, contentions that fair trade has no harm-
ful side effects on competition will be considered.
75 S. Rep. No. 2819, supra note 47, at 11-12.
76 H.R. Rep. No. 566, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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Competitive selling is the state of affairs brought about when two
or more entrepreneurs vie with one another to attract the limited pur-
chasing resources of the public by offering goods and services in ex-
change. The greater the price, the greater is the average profit 7 per
sale; the greater the volume, the greater is the total profit.7 It is ele-
mentary that changes in price nearly always affect volume. The absence
of perfect competition gives retailers some freedom with regard to their
prices. The fact that one's prices for the same or readily substitutable
items are higher than those of another will not lead to a forfeiture of
all sales to the latter. The potential customer's lack of knowledge of
the difference, his immediate convenience, or plain inertia will fre-
quently result in a willingness to pay the higher price. Yet these factors
tend to be transient in effect and will not forever stave off the high-
price seller's demise.
There can be but one rational reason for the price differential if
what the consumer receives is exactly the same at the high and the low
priced outlets and all merchandise lines are priced "rationally. ' '79 That
basis exists where one retailer faces higher costs selling at his most
profitable volume level than does the other selling at the same level.
The less efficient one seeks to maximize his profit by charging more
per sale even though this may result in a decrease in volume and prob-
ably lower total revenue. 0 The loss of total revenue occasioned by the
77 Meaning return to invested capital, and, in the case of the proprietor actively
engaging in the prosecution of the business, return to his labor as well.
78 This assumes that the scale of operations is fixed and that volume is not so great
that the cost of effecting each additional sale is not greater than the average cost for
all sales. If the cost of making the marginal sale were greater than the average cost
of all previous sales, the expenditure would bring the average costs up. The assumption of
a fixed "scale of plant" is realistic for the short-run, which in the case of retailers
might mean a fairly long time. Their scale is not so flexible. Moreover, it is probably
reasonable to assume that the variable costs of the typical retail firm (chiefly cost of goods
sold) increase almost linearly within the range of normally encountered short-run
volume variations. Proportionately high fixed costs (overhead) average less and less
per sale as volume increases. Combined with the nearly linear increase in variable cost,
the result is a lower (total) average cost per sale meaning more of the price is left
for the retailer. In sum, it is assumed that most outlets are operating at slightly less
than optimum volume, i.e., volume at which the average cost of making a sale is
minimal and greater volume would be at the expense of business profits. Price is also
presumed constant.
79 I.e., to yield the maximum total profit from sales of each line.
80 The amount of decrease in revenue depends on the degree to which volume
varies in response to changes in price, that is, the price elasticity of the product. Since
it is usual for retailers to have some monopoly price control, limited price increases may
not have the effect of reducing volume drastically, and perhaps not at all, in the short
run at least.
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lesser output will be less percentage-wise than the total cost avoided,
however."' There may be any number of reasons for the greater ineffi-
ciency which requires higher prices to yield an adequate return to the
factors combining to provide the services of distribution. Poor manage-
ment techniques, unsophisticated inventory handling, and uninformed
buying practices would all obviously lead to costlier operation. That
the mere fact of smallness deprives enterprise of the economies accru-
ing to larger scale is also a factor.82 Whatever the reasons for the
higher costs, however, the competitive economy will tolerate neither the
costs nor the waste which results. The extra expense of inefficiency will
be reflected in extra price which must be paid for the comparable value
received. When consumers finally refuse to pay that extra price, the
wasteful operation will be terminated by bankruptcy. It is in this
manner that the pressures of competition insure that the most will be
provided at the lowest cost to society. By freezing prices and prevent-
ing any natural downward movement, fair trade neutralizes these pres-
sures and hamstrings the operation of competition. Rather than suc-
cumbing as they would in a free market, inefficient firms may manage
to survive on the artificially maintained prices which the fair trade
manufacturer sets. In paying the artificially maintained price, the
public is, in effect, taxed to subsidize the unproductive. Fair trade thus
institutionalizes a drain on the vitality of the entire economy.
81 This is true by definition assuming for the purpose of comparison that the
smaller retailer is selling at approximately that volume calculated to maximize his profits.
This assumption that profits are being maximized must be indulged in order that the
comparison of the efficiencies of the larger and smaller scales of plant might be mean-
ingful. If the profits of a given operational scale are being maximized at a given
volume (and price) level, the implication is that they would be less at a higher volume
(and lower price) level. A larger scaled seller would face the same costs per sale only at
a higher volume because of the economies accruing to larger scale. Moreover, the low
cost seller's greater scale causes his profit maximizing volume to be higher than that of
the smaller outlet, which higher volume can be achieved by charging less for the
merchandise. The reason for the larger seller's higher profit maximizing volume is that
the costs for his additional sales increases with greater volume at a rate less than the
marginal cost increase for the smaller seller (who is deprived of scalar economies). Be-
cause lower prices are required to effect volume increases, the revenue from the addi-
tional sales also declines; but so long as there is a price-cost differential (which there
would be at relatively higher volume for the larger seller) there is profit in the sale.
To maximize total profits, the larger seller must sell at greater volumes. Thus, because
of their different cost pictures, smaller sellers maximize their profits at lower volumes
and higher prices than do larger ones.
82 Among reasons for the greater economies resulting from merely being big are
that a greater division of labor permits specialization in the various aspects of retailing
leading to more efficiency. Greater capital resources provide flexibility which may be
used to meet situations or to implement more efficient techniques.
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A closely related vice of fair trade is its potential to promote
slovenly practices on the part of even the efficient among protected re-
tailers. The motivation to promote efficiency, to make capital invest-
ments, and to strive to perform the distributive function as economically
as possible are all absent when such efforts will be unrewarded by
greater patronage in response to lower prices . 3 While the retailer
might advantage himself by streamlining his operations so as to leave
a greater part of the revenues as profit, the easier and certainly less
risky course would be simply to rely on his suppliers to maintain the
level of prices. It is ironic, if not pathetic, that many American busi-
nessmen can become enthralled with a scheme which rejects profit as
the criterion of economic usefulness or productivity. Without profit as
a criterion, the incentive to do a better job is removed.
We have seen that competition performs a vital public service.
Nearly everyone intuitively, at least, understands its mechanisms and
realizes its value. It is therefore not surprising that retail proponents
of fair trade are reluctant to admit that the ability of discount stores
to sell goods at unmatchable prices is due to their greater efficiency.
Rather the blame is placed on the discounter's use of "unfair" tactics.
It is not competition which is sought to be irradicated but its abuse.
Specifically, the unfairness towards which fair trade is directed is the
use which "unscrupulous" retailers make of loss-leaders to stimulate
their own business.84 The theory of the unfairness is this: Customers
are drawn into the store with offers of reputable, branded merchandise
sold at bargain prices. Deceived into thinking that the store offers bar-
gains generally, the customer buys other items as well. By then selling
the customer less well known products (or their own inferior brands)
at relatively greater markups, the store makes up for its loss. The un-
fairness inheres in luring customers away from other sellers by means
of this deception. It has been suggested that the supposed necessity of
selling "lemons" along with loss-leaders in order to recover a profit is
illusory, however.8 5 As has been pointed out,86 increased volume may
lower the average cost of making each sale. Therefore, the increased
sales volume of the non-loss led items which the discounter sells could
result in a greater total profit from the sales of those lines. This greater
83 The consumer suffers also in that he is insulated from the savings arising from
greater distribution efficiency, which savings would, at least partly, accrue to him where
competitive retailing prevailed.
84 For a discussion of the "disparaging" effects of loss leaders, see text accom-
panying notes 58-63 supra.
85 See Herman, "Fair Trade: Origins, Purposes, Effects," 27 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
621, 642 (1959).
86 Supra note 78.
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profit on non-loss led lines may more than compensate for the loss
incurred in selling the loss-leaders at below cost. In fact, the increased
profitability arising from the greater volume in the non-loss led lines
might be realized even though the prices on those lines are cut. The
consumer, while taking advantage of bargains on some items sold, is
thus not necessarily "stung" on others. Although this reasoning does
not prove that loss-leader promotion is actually beneficial to the con-
sumer, it, considered with the discounter's presumable hesitation to
impair tomorrow's sales by gypping the customer today, increases
the difficulty of accepting contrary averments.
Because the loss-leader is designed to divert business from com-
petitors, a trend which may, if carried to the extreme, cut them out
of the market entirely, its use in competition has been characterized
as "unfair." The type of competition which results is not the gentle-
manly variety of whose value all are aware, but it is destructive of
useful enterprise. Unchecked, this destructive competition will bank-
rupt most small (and therefore weaker) businesses leaving only the
powerful giants to monopolize the channels of distribution. At the
same time, manufacturers, seeing their traditional distributive systems
slipping into oblivion (why they cannot sell through the giants is
uncertain), feel constrained to integrate vertically,8 7 thereby increasing
the monopoly. Thus, it is concluded, fair trade benefits the consumer
who ultimately must suffer the evils of monopoly.
To appreciate the benefits of fair trade as monopoly-preventive
legislation, the vice of concentrated market power must be understood.
Monopoly power has many advantages, most notably the economies
which accrue to its scale; it is therefore unrealistic to consider it to
be a universally undesirable market structure."8 Its greatest defect
is probably its controllable, but inevitable, tendency towards restricted
output and higher prices. These phenomena result from the monopo-
list's natural inclination to maximize his profits."9 Having control
of the entire supply of the commodity he sells, the monopolist can
force the consumer to pay the extra price.
Regardless of how undesirable a highly centralized retailing sys-
tem may be, undesirability alone indicates neither the necessity nor
the usefulness of fair trade laws in combatting it. In the first place,
it is extremely doubtful that there is a trend towards a declining avail-
87 That is, create a manufacturer-operated retailing system which is integrated into
the manufacturing operations.
88 Consider, for example, the inconvenience of having two local telephone companies.
89 The monopolist's profits would be greater than the total that would accrue to
competitors serving the same market.
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ability of competing stores among which a consumer may choose or,
if there were, that fair trade would be capable of arresting it. Statistics
prepared from the Statistical Abstract of the United States and pre-
sented before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary
Committee90 indicate that the number of retail drug stores declined
slightly in both fair trade and free trade jurisdictions91 between the
years 1935 and 1948. The percentage of decline in neither case ex-
ceeded one percent. 92 During the same period, the number of drug
stores per million dollars of sales also fell in nearly identical propor-
tions for each area. Similarly, the number of drug outlets per one
million persons declined by approximately the same percentages in
fair trade and non-fair-trade jurisdictions. The drop left a substantially
greater number per million persons in free trade jurisdictions where
their density was greater prior to 1935.11 Such uncomplicated statistics
raise, if not answer, the question of the usefulness of fair trade in pro-
tecting small business. From them it is difficult to conclude anything
but that fair trade has failed to affect noticeably the viability of the
drug stores which it protects. 4 Nor does it appear that the monopoli-
zation of retailing is proceeding any faster in non-fair-trade states than
in states where fair trade is actively battling monopolization. Worthy
of note is that the manufacturers of goods normally sold in drug stores
are probably more actively engaged in fair trade than are the suppliers
of any other major type of outlet.
Thus, it is particularly significant that thirteen years of resale
price maintenance has failed discernibly to affect the vitality of drug
retailers. Looked at another way, the effect of unencumbered compe-
tition in weeding out inefficient retailers was no greater in free trade
states than where it was forbidden by law. Perhaps free price compe-
tition motivated small retailers to become more efficient and allowed
the natural replacement of those which did not. Perhaps when a busi-
ness is unhealthy and doomed, not even artificial stimulation can save
it. Perhaps it is not a problem of survival at all which motivates small
retailers to want fair trade.
Even if the absolute number of retail establishments is decreasing,
90 Statement by Q. Forrest Walker, Hearings on H.R. 4365 Before the Antitrust
Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 508 (1952).
91 Missouri, Texas, Vermont, and the District of Columbia.
92 From a total of 5,773 to 5,717 in free trade states as against 50,924 to 50,079
in fair trade states.
93 Also presented to the subcommittee were statistics taken from the Survey
of Current Business showing that the number of retail firms in general fluctuated cor-
respondingly in fair and free trade states. Hearings on H.R. 4365, supra note 90, at 509.
94 See Herman, supra note 85, at 637-40.
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mass mobility adds a new dimension to the modern situation as com-
pared to that of the 1930's. Then, if there were only one merchant
in the neighborhood, he had a virtual monopoly; now, it is neither
uncommon nor inconvenient to drive relatively great distances in
search of a bargain. The point is, simple mobility, by extending the
shopper's range, has given him access to a greater number of estab-
lishments than ever before. With the effective market thus expanded,
competition has actually increased since 1935, despite the decrease in
absolute numbers of individual sellers. Since there is a limit on how
gigantic the giants may become, legally 5 if not physically, it seems
unlikely that any retailer will ever be able to take over any substantial
market area.
But even if complete monopolization were a threat, fair trade
hardly seems to be an appropriate countering device. Rather than pre-
serving competition, it permits formerly competing firms to adopt
a common price policy and to behave as a market dominating unit.
Fair trade actually facilitates the creation of monopoly power by re-
moving the legal obstacles to unified action by competitors."" It also
eliminates the administrative and practical difficulties attending the
giant mergers which otherwise would be necessary to concentrate
market control. The power to extract an "excessive"" price from con-
sumers is no less where the monopoly results from a unified price
policy among small retailers than where it consists of a monolithic
large retailer. The immediate effect on competition is the same. In the
long run, however, the fair-trade-created monopoly is worse than the
monolith. Whereas the handsome profits accruing to the latter will at-
tract competitors who will bid price down, the law protects the fair
trade monopoly from such spoilers.
9 Since presumably no "giant" could long avoid affecting interstate commerce,
the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964), or the
Clayton Act, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964) should control any malignant
growth. Similar statutes exdst at the state level, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Bus. § 340; Va. Code
Ann. §§ 59-20 to -40 (1950), as amended, Va. Code Ann. 59-20, -40 (Supp. 1964); Wis.
Stat. Ann. 133.01 (Supp. 1964).
96 Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). To be
exempted, the collusion must, of course, be vertical. However, the exempting legislation
apparently allows the tacit horizontal conspiracy which might otherwise be imputed to
an arrangement wherein competitors enter price fixing agreements with a third person
knowing that their act is part of a common plan to affect price. Cf. United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316
U.S. 265 (1942) ; Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
07 That is, the price would be greater than the amount necessary to reimburse the
seller for his actual sacrifice in distributing the goods, which amount would, under
competition tend to determine price.
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It has been seriously contended that, although fair trade operates
to fix price, it neither destroys competition nor deprives the public
of its advantages. Two lines of reasoning have been offered in support
of this contention. The first is premised on the proposition that useful
competition is not affected by fair trade, only unfair or destructive
competition. One would expect the phrase "unfair, destructive com-
petition" to refer to the situation where, as a result of the ungamely
tactics of some competitors, others are forced out of business for
reasons other than their relative inability to perform efficiently. As
was seen above, the unfairness inheres in expanding volume by deceiv-
ing customers into believing that they receive more for their money by
trading with the unfair competitor than they do elsewhere. 8 All healthy
competition is destructive in the sense that it forces unsound enter-
prises to discontinue. Unfortunately, however, "unfair destructive
competition"99 has come to suggest in many minds any competitive
situation in which an over-ambitious retailer tries to increase his sales
at the expense of his competitors. The typical sort of discount selling
may have this destructive effect. But such selling need not be deceptive
to be profitable; the lower prices can truthfully reflect lower costs and
the curtailment of unnecessary services. If the consumer is getting
what he thinks he is getting, i.e., there is no deception, and the dis-
counting retailer is profiting from the transaction, it is difficult to
perceive the unfairness of the lower prices, even if their effect is to
drive high-cost sellers from the marketplace. The non-price and pre-
sumably fair competition which survives the operation of fair trade
(such as advertising 00 and promotional gimmickery) is of little or no
benefit to the consumer. Any price competition remaining above the
maintained minimum which may remain would be only of limited
benefit.
98 Loss-leader selling would, of course, typify this situation where the dealer made
up for his losses by selling "lemons."
99 "Unfair competition," as used in the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat.
719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964), includes the Sherman Act violations of
conspiracy to restrain trade and monopolization in 50 Stat. 693 (1955), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964). In combination with the Robinson-Patman sections, 49 Stat.
1526, 1528 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a (1964), prohibiting predatory pric-
ing for the purpose of monopolization, an adequate remedy for malicious or destruc-
tive competitive tactics ought to be provided. However, fair trade is not merely
redundant. Its interference with free competitive practices applies whether or not un-
savory techniques are being employed against competitors.
'100 The generally more laudable function of advertising, that of informing the con-
suming public of the available purchasing options becomes nugatory at the retail level
if all sellers offer the same items at the same fair trade price. Because convenience would
be the only rational reason for choosing one retail establishment over another, retail
[Vol. 27
COMMENT
Secondly, it is claimed that because free and open competition
among goods of the same general class is a statutory prerequisite to
use of fair trade,10' the continued operation of competitive pressures
on price are assured. If the meaning of "free and open competition"
were known, it would be easier to appraise this allegation. The scanty
existing authority seems to indicate that the requirement is satisfied
if the market is shared by more than one seller.'0 2 Even direct com-
petition among goods is not required-only the existence of competing
goods of the same general class.10 3 This is a fairly weak requirement,
especially in view of the dubious quality of competition where oligopoly
or duopoly market structures exist at the manufacturer level. The
Department of Justice has noted the considerable use of "follow the
leader" pricing in such markets, and that although there is not a con-
spiracy in the ordinary sense, competition is likewise absent. 4 At any
rate, it is missing the point to believe that competition prevails under
fair trade because producer level competition is unaffected. The con-
sumer is entitled to competition among dealers as well as manufactur-
ers.'1e The price paid for the services of warehousing and distributing
the commodity ought to be subject to competitive pressures just as
is the price for producing it. The absence of competition in some links
of the chain of supply cannot compensate for its weakness or absence
in others.
A final reason to doubt the value of fair trade as society's salvation
from creeping monopoly is to be found in the considerable, though
unpublicized, support given it by chain store interests. 0 6 Testifying
during Senate hearings on the Miller-Tydings enabling amendment,
the Secretary of the National Association of Chain Drug Stores made
advertising would more than ever be directed towards producing economically irrational
reactions.
101 See examples cited supra notes 11 & 12.
102 Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158 F.2d $92, 594 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330
U.S. 828 (1947). See also Eastman Kodak Co., 44 F.T.C. 14 (1947).
103 Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, supra note 102, at 594.
104 Department of Justice, Report to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate
Select Committee on Small Business, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., on a Study of the Development
of the Antitrust Laws and Current Problems of Antitrust Enforcement 21 (Subcomm.
Print No. 3, 1952).
105 This was a conclusion drawn by the FTC after its study of resale price main-
tenance two decades ago. FTC, Resale Price Maintenance, Summary and Conclusions
LXIV (1945).
106 See Edwards, Memorandum for the Assistant Attorney General, Re Grounds
for the Repeal of Miller-Tydings Which Authorizes Resale Contracts (1941), reprinted
in Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 1, pt. 1, 436 (1952).
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the rather amazing statement that the chain drug stores of the country
were "all for the bill."'0 7 Two possible explanations have been offered
for the interest shown by these supposedly embryonic retailing
monopolies against whose growth fair trade is presumably aimed."0 '
Now that the chain drug stores are firmly rooted in the market struc-
ture, they are beginning to feel the competitive stings of newcomers
to the field. The chain drug store, having outgrown its need for ag-
gressive price competition, now finds that its best interest is served
by eliminating it. Like the small druggist who preceded it, the chain
store has reached a position of comfortable prominence and would
prefer not to witness further economic evolution.1 9
Alternatively, for the chain store whose private brands"0 have
become fairly well established, fair trade agreements can be very
handy in a program of price competition. By cutting the prices of
his non-fair-traded private brands, the chain store can raid its smaller
competitors who, not being able to afford private labels of their own,
are powerless to retaliate. Rather than protecting the small independent
from the mammoth chains, fair trade can thus be demonstrated to be
of invaluable assistance to the latter in achieving their ultimate take-
over. Quite apart from depriving the public of the advantages of price
competition, fair trade appears to be hopelessly inept both at fighting
monopoly and at providing protection to the small retailer.
2. Preservation of Retailer Services
The proponents of fair trade claim that if the discounter is not
taking a loss on the low-priced items which lure customers into the
store, he necessarily is cutting corners in order to reap a profit from
his enterprise."' Service minded retailers stock such unprofitable
staple items as nails and bolts purely as a convenience to their cus-
tomers. Although a loss may be taken on these items, the small retailer
makes up for it by selling more profitable, national brand merchandise.
107 Hearings on S. 3822 Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1936).
108 Edwards, supra note 106, at 438.
109 Later, during House hearings the Secretary of the National Association of
Chain Drug Stores echoed the wails of the small independent decrying bait merchandising
and predatory pricing. Hearings on H-R. 1611 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1, at 22 (1937).
110 Private brands are branded products made for and sold exclusively by te
retailer featuring them.
11 The contention was argued in the brief of the amid curiae in Hudson Distribs.,
Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 377 U.S. 386 (1964).
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Discounters who stock only lines showing high turn-over and profit-
ability can ruin the retail price level on the "bread and butter" items
by selling them at cut-rate prices. In doing so they skim the cream
off the market, leaving the small retailer only the uninteresting and
unprofitable service burden. The consumer will, for a time, enjoy
"having his cake and eating it too" by patronizing the small merchant
when he needs staple items and turning to the discounter for larger
purchases. Ultimately, the argument goes, the end will come. The
abused small retailer will have vanished leaving only the variety-shy
discounter to serve the public.
Providing staple items at little profit is not the only service which
the purchaser may forego in taking his business to the discount store.
The small retailer may be in a position to offer special ordering services,
easy credit arrangements, a liberal refund policy, and so forth, es-
pecially to his regular customers. Some purchasers may prefer simply
to avoid the more austere premises on which the discounter typically
does business. The personal service obtainable in small outlets has
been contrasted with the sparse and often untrained sales personnel
found in the discount store. Rather than being left to his own devices
in making his selection, the patron of the small store can avail himself
to the freely offered advice concerning the relative merits of the seller's
wares. 
112
Unquestionably there is a trend among larger retailers to curtail
those services which they feel the consumer is not so interested in
having, while retaining worthwhile ones such as refunds, dealer war-
ranties, repair departments, home delivery, and time payment plans.113
One discount chain reported that such cutbacks produced substantial
saving which may be passed on to the consumer.1 4 If the small busi-
nessman is providing the consumer with invaluable services which
cannot be obtained at the large discount store, it is also true that con-
sumers are driving past him to take advantage of the better prices
offered by the discounter. One must not forget that the small busi-
112 Fair trade may defeat its own purpose in this regard by encouraging manufac-
turers to try to influence the tenor of this freely offered advice, though, as was seen in
the text accompanying note 66 supra, 567 of retailers of fair traded products admitted
responding to the manufacturer's call.
113 These latter two are sometimes provided, though at an additional cost to
tha actual beneficiaries, rather than distributing the cost among all customers in the
form of higher prices.
114 The gross overhead reportedly dropped to 11.9% compared with 34% for the
average department store, Hearings on S. 3850 Before the Senate Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1958).
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nessman who is robbed of high profit sales by the larger stores' com-
petitive victory may still make a profit by simply raising the price
of staples. 15
If the services which the large outlet curtails in order to lower
prices are considered worthwhile by the purchasing public, fair trade
is not necessary to sustain the small businessman who provides them.
If not, the artificial rigidity placed on the economy by resale price
maintenance will perpetuate their rendition only at the expense of the
consumer who would rather use his money on something he wants.
So long as deceptive practices on the part of competitors are prevented
by governmental agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission, the
consumer will, by the pattern of his spending, indicate what his prefer-
ences are. Resale price maintenance will not breathe life back into
dead tastes; it only thwarts the mechanism giving expression to public
desires and sparking the structural economic changes required to serve
the wants of society. Unless we are prepared to underwrite forever
the production of services for which public demand has subsided, a
governmental plan to do anything but soften the blow of obsolescence
seems impractical. If the pinch on small business is caused by a shift
in consumer preferences to discount retailing (and its lower prices,
fewer services, and less variety), arguing the social value of the cur-
tailed services will not indicate the desirability of fair trade. If con-
sumers do not want the services, they have no social value.
3. Miscellaneous Considerations Contra
In opposition to fair trade it has been argued: (1) that permitting
vertical agreements is contrary to the national antitrust policy against
combinations in restraint of trade; (2) that the nature of fair trade
encourages retailers who cannot themselves combine to fix prices,
secretly to pressure manufacturers to join them in order to lend an
aura of legality to their conspiracy; and (3) that it raises prices and
interferes with the mechanism of competition.
Because of its rather limited public welfare justification and its
extremely mischievous potential, fair trade was considered to be an
"unwarranted compromise . . . of national antitrust policy" by the
Attorney General's Committee to Study Antitrust Laws."' Of much
concern is the usefulness of fair trade in circumventing the horizontal
price fixing prohibitions of the Sherman Act. Ironically, for all the
115 By virtue of their being staples, they would presumably have a fairly inelastic
demand, meaning that a price calculated to bring a fair return would not result in a
serious volume decline.
116 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 154 (1955).
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interest which retailers show in the promotion and enforcement of
fair trade legislation, and for all the talk about such laws being neces-
sary for the protection of the small retailer, there is nothing in the
statutes which permits the retailer to initiate action in his own behalf.
True to the original purpose of the law, it is structured to allow
manufacturers voluntarily to enter resale price maintenance agree-
ments with their distributors. The illogical result is that some bene-
ficiaries of the legislation are protected at the discretion of others.
This is a situation which invites conspiracy. The obvious advantages
that a fair trade agreement offers naturally tempts retailers to seek
them for the merchandise which they sell. When the manufacturer re-
fuses to play along, retailers, especially those who can pool their forces,
e.g., a trade association, may attempt to coerce the manufacturer into
entering the desired agreement." 7 This horizontal combination to
compel resale price maintenance is a violation of the Sherman Act."'
A number of instances of coercion have been litigated'" or subjected
to administrative action. Perhaps the classic case of abuse was the
vicious and predatory campaign which the National Association of
Retail Druggists waged against Pepsodent when the latter decided to
drop its program of resale price maintenance. So ' successful were
California druggists in cutting Pepsodent out of the toothpaste market
that Pepsodent meekly returned offering a penance of 25,000 dollars
to be used in the promotion of fair trade legislation. 2 A letter from
the executive secretary of the National Association of Retail Druggists
to a rebellious manufacturer of toiletries threatened a "campaign...
to ... cause you more trouble and take away more business than you
had ever realized.'1 21 In fact, the executive secretary has conceded
that the only way for druggists to benefit fully from the legislation is
to "work together and force these manufacturers into line.' 212 Not all
proponents of fair trade approve of such abuses, 23 yet the executive
secretary of NARD refused to admit that any genuine abuses have
ever occurred.24 The difficulty of preventing the numerous violations
117 See FTC, Resale Price Maintenance, 143, 166-218, 396-99 (1945).
118 United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
"10 See cases cited in H.R. Rep. No. 1516, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1952).
120 For a more complete description of the events and tactics, see FTC, op. cit.
supra note 117, at 145.
121 Id. at 166-67.
122 Id. at 168. (Emphasis added.)
123 Most notable of the disclaimers of coercive pressures is that of the American
Fair Trade Council, Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee on the Study of
Monopoly Power of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 1,
pt. 1, 889-90 (1952).
124 Id. at 799.
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of the anti-conspiracy provision of the Sherman Act, combined with
the observation that most resale price maintenance agreements, if in-
vestigated, would be found to have such illegal origins 5 casts serious
doubt on the desirability of fair trade. Since it is almost impossible to
authorize vertical price fixing agreements without sabotaging the effec-
tiveness of horizontal price fixing prohibitions, it would seem ill-advised
to do so unless we are ready to change our policy towards price fixing
altogether.
Empirical data regarding the effect of fair trade on prices are
conflicting.126 It is almost inconceivable that prices would not average
at least a little higher because the added price rigidity occasioned by
fair trade tends to keep prices from falling but is without impediment
to their going up. The motives behind fair trade perhaps provide the
answer: the very desire to place a floor under prices implies that they
would otherwise be lower.
The factor contributing most to the dynamism of the fair trade
movement is perhaps the effect of the legislation to increase the profit-
ability of being in business. The apparent inability of the legislation
to influence either the number or the competitive durability of retail
outlets has been seen. Considering this fact with the unquestionable
capacity of fair trade to produce greater retail profits makes claims
that the very survival of small business is at stake seem a trifle insin-
cere. Drug retailing, which accounts for the sale of more fair traded
items than any other category,2 7 provides a case in point. Disease and
affliction have, to a great extent, been replaced in this country by a
large and fabulously profitable drug industry. The distribution end,
of course, does not want to be left out. Because one buys drugs largely
out of impelling necessity, their volume is not likely to be much affected
by price, so long as it is within the reach of the buyer. 2 ' The druggist
is aware that fair trade can assure him of the high markup which is
necessary to reap the profits he wants.'29 In fact, the announced pur-
125 FTC, op. cit. supra note 117, Summary and Conclusions at LXI.
126 The report of a thorough survey of the effect of fair trade on toothpaste prices
(comparing fair trade states with free trade states, and the price situation existing before
and after passage of the McGuire Act) concludes that fair trade pushes prices up.
Bowman, "The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance," 22 U. Chi. L. Rev.
825, 849 (1955). Another article concluded that fair trade has no effect on prices. Adams,
"Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy," 64 Yale L.J. 967, 973 (1955).
127 Cf. text accompanying note 52 supra.
128 Most non-pharmaceutical drugstore items probably have relatively inelastic
demands. Some, such as perfumes and vitamin pills, may even be negatively price elastic.
129 "High markups" may mean 340% for aspirin, 450% for prophylactics, and
1000i% (ten times) for phenobarbiturates. Hearings on H.R. 10527 Before the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 676 (1958).
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pose of NARD's supporting fair trade is not the elimination of de-
ceptive or unfair competition but the establishment of a fifty percent
markup on all items sold in the drug store.130 That the profit motive
is ultimately behind fair trade should come as a surprise to nobody.
As with any cause, the reasons offered in support of the legislation are
not necessarily the ones which induce the expenditures of time and
money required to secure and successfully utilize it. Though the exis-
tence of these private motivations among fair trade's supporters do not
automatically discredit it as a measure designed to protect the public
welfare, they may not be ignored in assessing its desirability.
III. SuMRn Y AND CONCLUSION
Legislation permitting vertical agreements to fix retail prices,
though once operational in nearly every state, has been held invalid
in about one-half the jurisdictions in which it was originally enacted.
Even where it has not been found to be inconsistent with state consti-
tutional provisions, its prerogatives have been little exercised. The
federal constitutionality of fair trade has been favorably determined,
and special exemptory legislation bars federal antitrust statutes from
frustrating its operation. The prices fixed in contracts entered pursuant
to the legislation are made mandatory upon all sellers within the juris-
diction. Most commonly this is accomplished through a non-signer
clause in the statute which declares sales below the contractual mini-
mum to be unfair trade practices.
Fair trade inevitably results in some social cost. The protection
provided for the goodwill of the manufacturer has been forwarded as
a justification for this cost. Manufacturers of products for which price
is taken as an indicium of quality, or whose reputation for exclusivity
is tarnished by a smaller price tag, would seem to have a valid interest
in maintaining retail price. Such a manufacturer's reputation, i.e., his
goodwill, may be seriously damaged by a price-cutting retailer who pro-
motes his own ends by selling the manufacturer's products at a loss.
The manufacturer's goodwill among his retailer-distributors can be im-
portant in securing special treatment for his products and such special
treatment can lead to more sales. Retailer goodwill and favored treat-
ment may be had by guaranteeing the dealer a higher markup through
fair trade. The effect of the special services in creating customer inter-
est in a manufacturer's line may more than outweigh the deterrent to
purchase resulting from the higher price. Used in this way, the function
of fair trade is somewhat analogous to that of advertising. Similarly,
fair trade has been cited as useful in maintaining wide distribution
130 FTC, op. cit. supra note 117, at 131.
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for a manufacturer's products by sustaining the interest of the many
retailers who are potential dealers in those products.
The cost of fair trade has also been justified on the grounds that
it protects small retailers from extinction caused by their relative in-
ability to compete with larger distribution units. There may be social
reasons for protecting the smaller retailer quite apart from any eco-
nomic considerations. Though some feel that fair trade is necessary
to prevent the gradual consolidation of retail outlets by protecting
existing fragmented markets, perhaps fair trade's deleterious effects on
price competition are worse than the monopoly which it is feared will
otherwise arise. If fair trade affords protected retailers a greater mea-
sure of security than they would have in its absence, it is not shown
by the comparative decline in their numbers in fair and free trade
states. The argument that fair trade is destructive only of "unfair de-
structive" competition and therefore is harmless to desirable forms
fails to recognize that all competition may be destructive of unproduc-
tive enterprise. Moreover, the retail non-price competition which re-
mains at the retail level when price is maintained is of little or no
benefit to the consumer, and the price competition above the main-
tained minimum, if any, is of limited benefit. The contention that fair
trade may operate only where there is free and open competition at
the manufacturer level and therefore does not deprive the consumer
of the benefits of price competition is misleading. The price paid for
the distributive services ought to be subject to competition as well as
the price paid for actual manufacture. The demonstrable competitive
utility of fair trade to large retailers casts further doubt on its value
in preserving a relatively atomized retail market.
Another reason offered for protecting the small retailer is to insure
continued production of the customer services such as greater variety
and trained sales personnel, which services are often lacking in discount
houses. But even if there is a trend among larger outlets to curtail
these services, fair trade should not be necessary to bring about their
production. In a competitive market a seller with whom the public is
satisfied does not need legislation to prop his prices and provide him
a profit on his operations.
In opposition to fair trade it has been argued that it does nothing
more than exempt a vocal interest group from the general national
policy of discouraging the decline in numbers of economic initiative
centers. Also, it has been alleged that the nature of fair trade facilitates
horizontal price fixing agreements which evade antitrust restrictions.
Finally, fair trade has been cited as artificially increasing the cost of
living to consumers.
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In summary, fair trade is intended to serve certain valid social
ends: the protection of trademark-associated goodwill, the preservation
of competition, and perhaps the preservation of a style of retailing
which, though more costly, results in desirable noneconomic benefits
to society. If fair trade were worth its cost to the manufacturer, one
would expect it to be more widely utilized than it presently is. Other
means of trademark protection do not seem to be so ineffective as to
permit nonusers to be readily deprived of the value of their trademarks.
Nor is fair trade demonstrably of value in keeping up the number of
retailers in the industry where it is most extensively used. For the
preservation of competition, fair trade appears to be an inordinately
drastic remedy. In their zeal to protect competitive marketing, its
supporters seem to have adopted a measure which has exactly the op-
posite effect. Thus, fair trade is of uncertain value in solving the prob-
lems for which it was designed; worse, even where it succeeds in doing
some good, its pernicious side effects may outweigh the good which
results. Only the almost complete lack of interest in fair trade among
manufacturers has allowed the survival of retail price competition in
fair trade jurisdictions. But apart from the ill which it may spawn, in
view of the wide scope of other federal economic and trademark legis-
lation and the broad acceptance of similar state legislation, it is ques-
tionable that fair trade is necessary at all.
John A. Humbach
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